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Abstract
We consider a variant of Hotelling’s location model that was proposed by Kohlberg (1983):
when choosing a firm, consumers take travel time and also (expected) waiting time, which again
depends on the number of consumers choosing that firm, into consideration. If we assume that
firms are symmetric, then we show that a subgame perfect equilibrium exists if there is an even,
but small, number of firms and no subgame perfect equilibrium exists if there is an odd, but
small, number of firms. Further, we illustrate by means of examples what other subgame perfect
equilibria exist if we allow for asymmetric firms.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Nos. C72, D43, R30
1 Introduction
The seminal paper of Hotelling (1929) describes a simple model of spatial competition: firms
compete for consumers by means of location on an interval. There are many variants of the model,
but most of the literature assumes that both the decision of the location as well the choice of the
price are strategic. We consider a more basic version in which firms only compete in their choice
of location.
Despite its simple structure, payo↵s in Hotelling’s model turn out to be discontinuous. In order
to circumvent this problem Kohlberg (1983) proposed the natural modification in which consumers
care about the travel time as well as the (expected) waiting time for service. This additional
feature guarantees payo↵s to be continuous. We consider a similar setting and obtain the following
contributions.
Results. First, Kohlberg (1983) claims that the modified model has no subgame perfect
equilibrium if there are more than two symmetric firms. In his analysis he assumes that firms do
not locate in the same location in equilibrium. We provide several examples of subgame perfect
equilibria in which two of the firms choose an equal location.
Second, we find that for more than three firms the equilibrium locations of the firms are di↵erent
from the equilibrium locations in the original model. For example, in the original model the outside
firms are always paired, whereas in the equilibrium with four or six symmetric firms this is not the
case.
Third, an intriguing aspect of Hotelling’s original model is the lack of an equilibrium if three
firms compete in location. We provide a condition under which a subgame perfect equilibrium
exists if we allow the three firms to be su ciently asymmetric.
⇤Address: Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maas-
tricht, The Netherlands. Email: m.schroeder@maastrichtuniversity.nl, h.peters@maastrichtuniversity.nl,
d.vermeulen@maastrichtuniversity.nl
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Fourth, we provide an example of a subgame perfect equilibrium in which counter intuitively,
a less e cient firm obtains a larger market share due to its location.
Related literature. Hotelling’s model is primarily used to explain product di↵erentiation or
the lack thereof. The original result found by Hotelling (1929) is that in the case of a duopoly, firms
want to minimize di↵erentiation. Eaton and Lipsey (1975) extend this analysis to multiple firms
and di↵erent market structures. They argue that firms have a tendency to create local clusters,
and minimum di↵erentiation is just a special case of a local cluster for two firms. The principle
of minimum di↵erentiation was criticized by d’Aspremont, Jaskold Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979)
by showing that no pure price equilibrium exists if locations are su ciently close. They show
that under quadratic transportation costs firms want to maximize di↵erentiation. Osborne and
Pitchik (1987) characterize a mixed strategy pricing equilibrium for linear transportation costs in
which firms have substantial di↵erentiation. Kohlberg (1983) introduces the modification in which
consumers take waiting costs into account and claims that no equilibrium exists for more than two
firms. Recently, Ahlin and Ahlin (2013) also included the e↵ect of negative network externalities
into the framework with strategic prices. They show that in the presence of congestion costs
di↵erentiation among duopolists is decreased. Other recent work considers Hotelling games on
graphs, for example Pa´lvo¨lgyi (2011) and Fournier and Scarsini (2014).
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the basic model with linear
waiting costs and provides preliminary results. In Section 3, we consider the model with symmetric
firms. The section is split into two main parts: an even number of firms and an odd number of
firms. Section 4 allows for asymmetric firms.
2 The model and preliminary results
Let N = {1, . . . , n} (where n   2) be the set of firms. Each firm sells a homogeneous product for
a fixed price. The goal of each firm is to maximize their market share. We assume that consumers
are uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. Each consumer purchases one product. In order to
do so, the consumer has to visit the location of one of the firms and incurs transportation costs. We
normalize the cost of travel to 1 per unit distance. In addition, each firm has (expected) waiting
costs: the more consumers visit a particular firm, the longer consumers need to wait.
Kohlberg (1983) assumes that the waiting costs of each firm are defined by a strictly increasing
continuous function in the number of consumers served. He assumes this function to be the same
for each of the firms. We assume that the waiting costs are linear in the proportion of consumers
visiting the firm. Moreover, we allow the importance of the waiting costs to di↵er from firm to
firm. An interpretation is that firms might have di↵erent speeds with which consumers are served.
The game proceeds in two stages. In the first stage firms simultaneously select a location. Then
in the second stage, the consumers (simultaneously) make their purchasing decision based on these
locations.
More formally, define X = [0, 1]n. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) 2 X be the vector of locations of the
firms. We define a choice function f : X ⇥ [0, 1] ! N that assigns a firm to each consumer for
every vector of locations. A strategy profile is a pair (x, f), where x is a vector of locations and f
a choice function.
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Given strategy profile (x, f), we define f 1i (x) = {z 2 [0, 1] | f(x, z) = i} for all i 2 N .1 For
i 2 N , let si(x, f) be the Lebesgue measure of the set f 1i (x) and define s(x, f) = (si(x, f))i2N . We
refer to si(x, f) as the market share of firm i. The total costs of a consumer at location z 2 [0, 1]
of visiting firm i 2 N are
Cz,i(x, f) = |xi   z|+ ai · si(x, f),
where ai 2 R+ is the latency of firm i.
2.1 Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
Definition 2.1. A strategy profile (x, f) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) if the fol-
lowing two conditions are satisfied:
(i) for all i 2 N , si(x, f)   si ((x i, x0i), f) for all x0i 2 [0, 1].2
(ii) for all x 2 X and for all z 2 [0, 1], Cz,f(x,z)(x, f)  Cz,i(x, f) for all i 2 N .
Kohlberg (1983) shows that if ai > 0 for all i 2 N , then for all vectors of locations x, there are
unique (in terms of measure) market shares that guarantee that Cz,f(x,z)(x, f)  Cz,i(x, f) for all
z 2 [0, 1] and all i 2 N .
The following example motivates why we focus on the concept of subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium.
Example. Assume N = {1, 2}, a1 = 0 and a2 = 1. See Figure 1.
0 x1 =
1
2 x2 =
2
3
5
6 1
s1 s2
Figure 1: Equilibrium, but no SPE.
Consider the following choice function.
f(x, z) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if x1 =
1
2 , x2 =
2
3 , z  56 ,
2 if x1 =
1
2 , x2 =
2
3 , z >
5
6 ,
1 if x1 =
1
2 , x2 6= 23 , z 2 [0, 1],
2 if x1 6= 12 , x2 2 [0, 1], z 2 [0, 1].
Observe that the strategy profile (x, f) is a Nash equilibrium, neither the firms nor the consumers
have an incentive to deviate. However, (x, f) is not an SPE, since condition (ii) in Definition 2.1
does not hold for all x 2 X.
In fact, for all vectors of locations there is a strategy profile that is a Nash equilibrium. But
not every vector of locations is an SPE.
We obtain the following lemma as a result from the behaviour of the consumers.
1We assume that f 1i (x) is Lebesgue measurable for all i 2 N .
2Define (x i, x0i) as the vector (x1, . . . , xi 1, x
0
i, xi+1, . . . , xn).
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Lemma 2.2. Let (x, f) be an SPE. Then for all i, j 2 N , with i 6= j and xi  xj, one of the four
following conditions is satisfied.
(i) xi = xj and Cz,i(x, f) = Cz,j(x, f) for all z 2 [0, 1].
(ii) xi < xj and Cz,i(x, f) = Cz,j(x, f) for all z 2 [0, xi] and Cz,i(x, f) > Cz,j(x, f) for all
z 2 (xi, 1].
(iii) xi < xj and Cz,i(x, f) < Cz,j(x, f) for all z 2 [0, xj) and Cz,i(x, f) = Cz,j(x, f) for all
z 2 [xj , 1].
(iv) xi < xj and there is y 2 (xi, xj) such that Cz,i(x, f) < Cz,j(x, f) for all z 2 [0, y), Cy,i(x, f) =
Cy,j(x, f) and Cz,i(x, f) > Cz,j(x, f) for all z 2 (y, 1].
Proof. (i) Let xi = xj . Suppose ai · si(x, f) 6= aj · sj(x, f). Since |xi  z| = |xj   z| for all z 2 [0, 1],
transportation costs are irrelevant. So a consumer visiting the firm with higher queuing costs is
better o↵ visiting the firm with lower queuing costs, which contradicts (ii) of Definition 2.1. Hence
Cz,i(x, f) = |xi   z|+ ai · si(x, f) = |xj   z|+ aj · sj(x, f) = Cz,j(x, f).
(ii) Let xi < xj and xi + ai · si(x, f) = xj + aj · sj(x, f). Take a consumer z 2 [0, xi] and
compare the costs of visiting firm i and j. By assumption, Cz,i(x, f) = xi   z + ai · si(x, f) =
xj   z + aj · sj(x, f) = Cz,j(x, f).
Take a consumer z 2 (xi, xj ]. Then
Cz,i(x, f) = z   xi + ai · si(x, f) > xi   z + ai · si(x, f) = xj   z + aj · sj(x, f) = Cz,j(x, f),
where the inequality follows from xi < z and the equality from the assumption.
Take a consumer z 2 (xj , 1]. Then
Cz,i(x, f) = z   xi + ai · si(x, f) = z   xj + xj   xi + ai · si(x, f)
> z   xj + xi   xj + ai · si(x, f) = z   xj + aj · sj(x, f) = Cz,j(x, f),
where the inequality follows from xi < xj and the third equality from the assumption.
(iii) Let xi < xj and xj + ai · si(x, f) = xi + aj · sj(x, f). Then, by symmetry of the problem, a
similar argument as for (ii) holds.
(iv) From (ii) and (iii), Cxi,i(x, f) 6= Cxi,j(x, f) and Cxj ,i(x, f) 6= Cxj ,j(x, f).
If xi and xj prefer the same firm, say for example firm i. Then all consumers prefer firm i over
j and so no consumer will visit firm j. However, this is a contradiction as the costs of consumer xj
for visiting firm j are 0, while for firm i strictly positive.
If Cxi,i(x, f) > Cxi,j(x, f) and Cxj ,i(x, f) < Cxj ,j(x, f). Then
ai · si(x, f) < xj   xi + ai · si(x, f) < aj · sj(x, f) < xj   xi + aj · sj(x, f) < ai · si(x, f),
where the first inequality follows from xi < xj , the second inequality from Cxj ,i(x, f) < Cxj ,j(x, f),
the third inequality again from xi < xj and the fourth inequality from Cxi,i(x, f) > Cxi,j(x, f).
Hence also this case results in a contradiction.
So Cxi,i(x, f) < Cxi,j(x, f) and Cxj ,i(x, f) > Cxj ,j(x, f). But then there is y 2 (xi, xj) with
Cy,i(x, f) = Cy,j(x, f).
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Remark. If (x, f) is an SPE, then we assume without loss of generality that x1  . . .  xn. By
Lemma 2.2, if (x, f) is an SPE such that there are consumers z, z0, with z < z0 and f(x, z) > f(x, z0),
then these consumers are indi↵erent between the two firms. Hence the assignment of z and z0 could
be interchanged. If we do this in such a way that the market shares are not altered, it is without
loss of generality to assume that for a given x, consumers z 2 [0, s1(x, f)) visit firm 1, consumers
z 2 [s1(x, f), s1(x, f) + s2(x, f)) visit firm 2, . . . , consumers z 2 [1  sn(x, f), 1] visit firm n. So in
the remainder of this paper, we will only consider these choice functions f , and moreover, in the
remainder we assume that f satisfies condition (ii) in Definition 2.1 for all x 2 X.
For each strategy profile (x, f), define zi(x, f) =
Pi
j=1 sj(x, f) for all i 2 N , where z0(x, f) = 0
and zn(x, f) = 1. The next lemma states that firms go where their consumers are. The result
implies that in an SPE, consumers never walk past a firm without visiting that firm.
Lemma 2.3. Let (x, f) be an SPE. Then xi 2 [zi 1(x, f), zi(x, f)].
Proof. Suppose xi /2 [zi 1(x, f), zi(x, f)]. We derive a contradiction by showing that firm i can
increase the market share. W.l.o.g see figure below. If multiple firms are located at xi, we consider
the firm with the lowest subscript.
zi 1 zi xi
si
Since (x, f) is an SPE, we have Czi 1(x,f),i 1(x, f) = Czi 1(x,f),i(x, f) and Czi(x,f),i(x, f) =
Czi(x,f),i+1(x, f). If firm i locates at x
0
i, with zi(x, f) < x
0
i < xi, then the transportation costs of
each consumer z 2 [zi 1(x, f), zi(x, f)] decrease. Hence zi 1((x i, x0i), f) must shift to the left and
zi((x i, x0i), f) must shift to the right such that the decrease in transportation costs is o↵set by an
increase in market share. This however implies si ((x i, x0i), f)) > si(x, f), which contradicts the
SPE condition.
Lemma 2.3 has the following two important implications for an SPE.
Lemma 2.4. Let (x, f) be an SPE. Then x1 = s1(x, f) and xn = 1  sn 1(x, f).
Proof. We show that x1 = s1(x, f). Symmetry of the problem implies xn = 1  sn 1(x, f).
Suppose x1 6= s1(x, f). Lemma 2.3 implies x1 < s1(x, f)  x2. If firm 1 locates at x01, with
x1 < x01 < s1(x, f), we observe from Cs1(x,f),1(x, f) = Cs1(x,f),2(x, f) that s1(x, f)   x01 + a1 ·
s1(x, f) < x2   s1(x, f) + a2 · s2(x, f). So in order to o↵set the decrease in transportation costs,
there must be an increase in the market share of firm 1. Hence s1((x 1, x01), f) > s1(x, f), which is
in contradiction with the SPE condition.
Lemma 2.5. Let (x, f) be an SPE. Then |{i 2 N | xi = x}|  2 for all x 2 [0, 1]. Moreover, if
xi = xi+1 for some i 2 N , then ai = ai+1.
Proof. Since si(x, f) > 0 for all i 2 N in an SPE, Lemma 2.3 implies |{i 2 N | xi = x}|  2 for all
x 2 [0, 1].
Let xi = xi+1 for some i 2 N . Suppose ai < ai+1. We derive a contradiction.
By Lemma 2.3, xi = xi+1 = zi(x, f). Define x0 = (x1, . . . , xi+1, xi, . . . , xn). We obtain the
following result.
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Claim. (x, f) is an SPE if and only if (x0, f) is an SPE.
Proof. Suppose (x, f) is an SPE. By Lemma 2.2, we have Cz,i(x, f) = Cz,i+1(x, f) for all z 2
[0, 1]. So in particular for all z 2 [zi 1(x, f), zi+1(x, f)]. Consider the following choice assignment
f(x0, z) =
8><>:
i+ 1 if z 2 [zi 1(x, f), zi 1(x, f) + si+1(x, f)],
i if z 2 [zi 1(x, f) + si+1(x, f), zi+1(x, f)].
f(x, z) if z 2 [0, zi 1(x, f)) or z 2 (zi+1(x, f), 1].
So the consumers visiting firm i + 1 are on the left of the consumers visiting firm i. Note
that si(x0, f) = si(x, f) and sj(x0, f) = sj(x, f) and so Cz,i(x0, f) = Cz,j(x0, f) for all z 2
[zi 1(x, f), zi+1(x, f)]. Since (x, f) is an SPE, (x0, f) is also an SPE.
Since the inverse implication can be proven analogously, this completes the proof of the Claim.
Because xi = xi+1, we have ai · si(x, f) = ai+1 · si+1(x, f) and thus by assumption si(x, f) >
si+1(x, f). Since xi+1 = zi(x, f) = zi 1(x, f) + si(x, f) > zi 1(x, f) + si+1(x, f), Lemma 2.3 im-
plies (x0, f) is not an SPE. But then by the above Claim, (x, f) is also no SPE, which implies a
contradiction.
3 Symmetric firms
Assume that all firms are symmetric, i.e. ai = a for all i 2 N . Note that if a = 0 we consider
Hotelling’s original model and if a > 0 we consider a special case of Kohlberg’s model. Kohlberg
(1983) claims that there are no SPE for more than two firms. We reevaluate this claim.
3.1 Even number of firms
3.1.1 Two firms
Assume N = {1, 2}.
Theorem 3.1. For all a   0, (x, f) is an SPE if and only if x =  12 , 12  and s(x, f) =  12 , 12 .
Proof. Let (x, f) be an SPE. Then by Lemma 2.4, x1 = s1(x, f) and x2 = 1   s2(x, f). Since
s1(x, f) + s2(x, f) = 1, we have x1 = x2. Since a1 = a2 = a, we have s1(x, f) = s2(x, f) =
1
2 and
also x1 = x2 =
1
2 .
Assume a1 = a2 = a. We show that x =
 
1
2 ,
1
2
 
and s(x, f) =
 
1
2 ,
1
2
 
forms an SPE. Assume
x =
 
1
2 ,
1
2
 
and s(x, f) =
 
1
2 ,
1
2
 
. Suppose firm 1 locates at x01 <
1
2 . Then
s1((x
0
1, x2), f) =
2x01 + 1 + 2a
4 + 4a
.
Since
2x01+1+2a
4+4a <
1
2 if x
0
1 <
1
2 , firm 1 has no profitable deviation to the left. By symmetry of the
problem, no deviation is profitable.
Remark. The SPE with symmetric firms is identical to the original equilibrium.
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3.1.2 Four firms
Assume N = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Theorem 3.2. An SPE exists if and only if (a) a = 0, or (b) a   2 · (2 +p5). In case an SPE
exists, it is unique.
For (a), the SPE (x, f) is given by x =
 
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
3
4 ,
3
4
 
and s(x, f) =
 
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4
 
.
For (b), the SPE (x, f) is given by x =
⇣
1+a
2+4a ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
1+3a
2+4a
⌘
and s(x, f) =
⇣
1+a
2+4a ,
a
2+4a ,
a
2+4a ,
1+a
2+4a
⌘
.
Proof. By Eaton and Lipsey (1975), there is a unique SPE if a = 0. Assume a > 0. By Lemma 2.5
and symmetry, we distinguish the following four cases.
(1) Assume x1 = x2 < x3 = x4. By Lemma 2.4, we obtain the figure below.
0 x1 = x2 z2 x3 = x4 1
s1 s2 s3 s4
Solving the equalities yields x =
 
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
3
4 ,
3
4
 
and s(x, f) =
 
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4
 
. Suppose firm 2 locates
at x02 =
1
2 . Then
s2
 
(x 2, x02), f
 
=
8 + 15a+ 4a2
32 + 56a+ 16a2
.
For this deviation to be unprofitable, we must have a = 0. This contradicts the assumption that
a > 0.
(2) Assume x1 < x2 = x3 < x4. By Lemma 2.3 and Lemma 2.4, we obtain the figure below.
0 x1 x2 = x3 x4 1
s1 s2 s3 s4
Solving the equalities yields x =
⇣
1+a
2+4a ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
1+3a
2+4a
⌘
and s(x, f) =
⇣
1+a
2+4a ,
a
2+4a ,
a
2+4a ,
1+a
2+4a
⌘
.
Suppose firm 2 locates as leftmost firm at x02 = s2 ((x 2, x02), f). Then
s2
 
(x 2, x02), f
 
=
(2 + a)(2 + 3a+ 2a2)
2(4 + 16a+ 17a2 + 4a3)
.
For this deviation to be unprofitable, we must have a   2 · (2 +p5).
To prove that the strategy profile is an SPE, it is su cient to check that firm 1 does not want
to deviate to the right and firm 2 does not want to deviate to the left.
For firm 1. Observe that firm 1 could only improve by being the rightmost firm. Suppose firm
1 locates as rightmost firm at x01 = 1  s1 ((x 1, x01), f). Then
s1
 
(x 1, x01), f
 
=
4 + 11a+ 11a2 + 4a3
8 + 38a+ 52a2 + 16a3
.
Since s1 ((x 1, x01), f) < s1(x, f) if a   2 · (2 +
p
5), firm 1 has no incentive to deviate.
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For firm 2. Since market shares are piecewise linear in the location of firm 2, we show that firm
2 has no incentive to locate at x02 = x1:
s2
 
(x 2, x02), f
 
=
(2 + a)(2 + 5a+ 4a2)
4(1 + 2a)(4 + 7a+ 2a2)
.
Since s2 ((x 2, x02), f) < s2(x, f) if a   2 · (2 +
p
5), firm 2 has no incentive to deviate. Since there
is also no incentive to locate as leftmost firm, firm 2 has no profitable deviation.
(3) Assume x1 = x2 < x3 < x4. By Lemma 2.3 and Lemma 2.5, we obtain the figure below.
Note that you can show that there is no SPE with z2(x, f) < x3.
0 x1 = x2 x3 x4 1
s1 s2 s3 s4
Solving the equalities yields x =
⇣
a2
1+3a+4a2 ,
a2
1+3a+4a2 ,
2a2
1+3a+4a2 ,
a+3a2
1+3a+4a2
⌘
and s(x, f) =⇣
a2
1+3a+4a2 ,
a2
1+3a+4a2 ,
a+a2
1+3a+4a2 ,
1+2a+a2
1+3a+4a2
⌘
. Suppose firm 2 locates at x02 = x3. Then
s2
 
(x 2, x02), f
 
=
a(4 + 7a+ 4a2)
6 + 22a+ 36a2 + 16a3
.
For this deviation to be unprofitable, we must have a = 0. However if a = 0, firm 4 has an incentive
to locate at x04 = x3. Hence there is no SPE.
(4) Suppose x1 < x2 < x3 < x4. By Kohlberg (1983), there is no SPE.3
Remark. (a) is the original Hotelling equilibrium. (b) are the equilibria with positive latencies,
which only exist for su ciently large a. Notice that even though firms are symmetric, their market
shares need not be equal.
Example. Let a = 9. By Theorem 3.2, Figure 2 is the outcome of the SPE.
0 x1 =
5
19 x2 = x3 =
1
2 x4 =
14
19 1
s1 s2 s3 s4
Figure 2: SPE with four symmetric firms.
3.1.3 Six firms
Assume N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}.
Theorem 3.3. An SPE exists if and only if (a) a = 0, or (b) a   29.88734. In case an SPE exists,
it is unique.
For (b), the SPE (x, f) is given by x =
⇣
1+2a+a2
2+6a+6a2 ,
1+3a+2a2
2+6a+6a2 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
1+3a+4a2
2+6a+6a2 ,
1+4a+5a2
2+6a+6a2
⌘
and
s(x, f) =
⇣
1+2a+a2
2+6a+6a2 ,
a+a2
2+6a+6a2 ,
a2
2+6a+6a2 ,
a2
2+6a+6a2 ,
a+a2
2+6a+6a2 ,
1+2a+a2
2+6a+6a2
⌘
.
3A proof similar to the previous cases can be used to show the result.
4a satisfies the inequality a4   27a3   84a2   68a  16   0
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Proof. By Eaton and Lipsey (1975), there are infinitely many SPE if a = 0. Assume a > 0. By
Lemma 2.5 and symmetry, we distinguish the following nine cases.
(1) Assume x1 = x2 < x3 = x4 < x5 = x6. By Lemma 2.4, we obtain the figure below.
0 x1 = x2 x3 = x4 x5 = x6 1
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
Solving the equalities yields x =
 
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
5
6 ,
5
6
 
and s(x, f) =
 
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
6
 
. Suppose firm
2 locates at x02 =
1
5 . Then
s2
 
(x 2, x02), f
 
=
(8 + 5a)(20 + 33a+ 6a2)
60(16 + 36a+ 21a2 + 3a3)
.
For this deviation to be unprofitable, we must have a = 0. This contradicts the assumption that
a > 0.
(2) Assume x1 = x2 < x3 = x4 < x5 < x6. By Lemma 2.4, we obtain the figure below. Note
that you can show that there is no SPE with z4(x, f) < x5.
0 x1 = x2 x3 = x4 x5 x6 1
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
Solving the equalities yields x =
⇣
a2
1+3a+6a2 ,
a2
1+3a+6a2 ,
3a2
1+3a+6a2 ,
3a2
1+3a+6a2 ,
4a2
1+3a+6a2 ,
a(1+5a)
1+3a+6a2
⌘
and s(x, f) =
⇣
a2
1+3a+6a2 ,
a2
1+3a+6a2 ,
a2
1+3a+6a2 ,
a2
1+3a+6a2 ,
a(1+a)
1+3a+6a2 ,
(1+a)2
1+3a+6a2
⌘
. Suppose firm 2 locates
an arbitrary small ✏ > 0 to the right. For this deviation to be unprofitable, we must have a = 0.
This contradicts the assumption that a > 0.
(3) Assume x1 = x2 < x3 < x4 = x5 < x6. By Lemma 2.4, we obtain the figure below. Note
that you can show that there is no SPE with z4(x, f) < x5.
0 x1 = x2 x3 x4 = x5 x6 1
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
Solving the equalities yields x =
⇣
1+a
4+6a ,
1+a
4+6a ,
3+3a
4+6a ,
3+4a
4+6a ,
3+4a
4+6a ,
3+5a
4+6a
⌘
and s(x, f) =⇣
1+a
4+6a ,
1+a
4+6a ,
1+a
4+6a ,
a
4+6a ,
a
4+6a ,
1+a
4+6a
⌘
. Suppose firm 2 locates an arbitrary small ✏ > 0 to the right.
For this deviation to be unprofitable, we must have a = 0. This contradicts the assumption that
a > 0.
(4) Assume x1 = x2 < x3 < x4 < x5 = x6. By Lemma 2.4, we obtain the figure below. Note
that you can show that there is no SPE with z2(x, f) < x3, or with z4(x, f) > x4.
0 x1 = x2 x3 x4 x5 = x6 1
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
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Solving the equalities yields x =
⇣
a
2+6a ,
a
2+6a ,
2a
2+6a ,
2+4a
2+6a ,
2+5a
2+6a ,
2+5a
2+6a
⌘
and s(x, f) =⇣
a
2+6a ,
a
2+6a ,
1+a
2+6a ,
1+a
2+6a ,
a
2+6a ,
a
2+6a
⌘
. Suppose firm 2 locates an arbitrary small ✏ > 0 to the right.
This deviation is always profitable.
(5) Assume x1 < x2 = x3 < x4 = x5 < x6. By Lemma 2.4, we obtain the figure below.
0 x1 x2 = x3 x4 = x5 x6 1
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
Solving the equalities yields x =
⇣
1+a
2+6a ,
1+2a
2+6a ,
1+2a
2+6a ,
1+4a
2+6a ,
1+4a
2+6a ,
1+5a
2+6a
⌘
and s(x, f) =⇣
1+a
2+6a ,
a
2+6a ,
a
2+6a ,
a
2+6a ,
a
2+6a ,
1+a
2+6a
⌘
. Suppose firm 2 locates an arbitrary small ✏ > 0 to the right.
For this deviation to be unprofitable, we must have a = 0. This contradicts the assumption that
a > 0.
(6) Assume x1 < x2 < x3 = x4 < x5 < x6. By Lemma 2.4, we obtain the figure below.
0 x1 x2 x3 = x4 x5 x6 1
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
Solving the equalities yields x =
⇣
1+2a+a2
2+6a+6a2 ,
1+3a+2a2
2+6a+6a2 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
1+3a+4a2
2+6a+6a2 ,
1+4a+5a2
2+6a+6a2
⌘
and s(x, f) =⇣
1+2a+a2
2+6a+6a2 ,
a+a2
2+6a+6a2 ,
a2
2+6a+6a2 ,
a2
2+6a+6a2 ,
a+a2
2+6a+6a2 ,
1+2a+a2
2+6a+6a2
⌘
. To prove that the strategy profile is
an SPE, it is su cient to check that firm 1 does not want to deviate to the right, firm 2 does not
want to deviate to the left nor the right, and firm 3 does not want to deviate to the left.
For firm 1. Observe that firm 1 could only improve by being the rightmost firm. Suppose firm
1 locates as rightmost firm at x01 = 1  s1 ((x 1, x01), f). Then
s1
 
(x 1, x01), f
 
=
(1 + a)2(2 + a)(3 + 2a)(2 + 3a)
2(1 + 3a+ 3a2)(12 + 44a+ 39a2 + 6a3)
.
Since s1 ((x 1, x01), f) < s1(x, f) if a   29.8873, firm 1 has no incentive to deviate.
For firm 2. Since market shares are piecewise linear in the location of firm 2, we show that firm
2 has no incentive to locate at x02 = x1:
s2
 
(x 2, x02), f
 
=
(1 + a)(16 + 56a+ 72a2 + 39a3 + 6a4)
4(1 + 3a+ 3a2)(16 + 36a+ 21a2 + 3a3)
.
Then we show that firm 2 has no incentive to locate as leftmost firm at x002 = s2 ((x 2, x002), f):
s2
 
(x 2, x002), f
 
=
(1 + a)(16 + 72a+ 124a2 + 105a3 + 44a4 + 6a5)
4(1 + 3a+ 3a2)(16 + 72a+ 100a2 + 47a3 + 6a4)
.
Finally we show that firm 2 has no incentive to locate as rightmost firm at x0002 = 1 s2 ((x 2, x0002 ), f):
s2
 
(x 2, x0002 ), f
 
=
(1 + a)(16 + 72a+ 124a2 + 101a3 + 40a4 + 6a5)
2(1 + 3a+ 3a2)(16 + 72a+ 100a2 + 49a3 + 6a4)
.
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Since s2 ((x 2, x02), f) < s2(x, f), s2 ((x 2, x002), f) < s2(x, f) and s2 ((x 2, x0002 ), f) < s2(x, f) if
a   29.8873, firm 2 has no incentive to deviate.
For firm 3. Since market shares are piecewise linear in the location of firm 3, we show that firm
3 has no incentive to locate at x03 = x2:
s3
 
(x 3, x03), f
 
=
a(2 + 3a)(8 + 18a+ 13a2 + 2a3)
4(1 + 3a+ 3a2)(12 + 32a+ 22a2 + 3a3)
.
Then we show that firm 3 has no incentive to locate at x003 = s1 ((x 3, x003), f) + s3 ((x 3, x003), f):
s3
 
(x 3, x003), f
 
=
a(16 + 76a+ 132a2 + 111a3 + 47a4 + 6a5)
4(1 + 3a+ 3a2)(4 + 24a+ 42a2 + 24a3 + 3a4)
.
Finally we show that firm 3 has no incentive to locate as leftmost firm at x003 = s3 ((x 3, x003), f):
s3
 
(x 3, x0003 ), f
 
=
(1 + 2a)(4 + 6a+ a2)(4 + 14a+ 19a2 + 11a3 + 3a4)
2(1 + 3a+ 3a2)(16 + 96a+ 204a2 + 184a3 + 65a4 + 6a5)
.
Since s3 ((x 3, x03), f) < s3(x, f), s3 ((x 3, x003), f)  s3(x, f) and s3 ((x 3, x0003 ), f) < s3(x, f) if
a   29.8873, firm 3 has no incentive to deviate.
(7) Assume x1 = x2 < x3 < x4 < x5 < x6. By Lemma 2.4, we obtain the figure below.
Note that you can show that there is no SPE with z2(x, f) < x3, or with z3(x, f) < x4, or with
z4(x, f) < x5.
0 x1 = x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 1
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
Solving the equalities yields x = 11+5a+10a2+10a3+6a4 · 
a4, a4, 2a4, a3 + 3a4, a2 + 3a3 + 4a4, a+ 4a2 + 6a3 + 5a4
 
and s(x, f) = 11+5a+10a2+10a3+6a4 · 
a4, a4, a3(1 + a), a2(1 + a)2, a(1 + a)3, (1 + a)4
 
. Suppose firm 2 locates an arbitrary small ✏ > 0
to the right. This deviation is always profitable.
(8) Assume x1 < x2 = x3 < x4 < x5 < x6. By Lemma 2.4, we obtain the figure below. Note
that you can show that there is no SPE with z3(x, f) < x4, or with z4(x, f) < x5.
0 x1 x2 = x3 x4 x5 x6 1
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
Solving the equalities yields x = 11+4a+7a2+6a3 · 
a2 + a3, a2 + 2a3, a2 + 2a3, a2 + 3a3, 2a2 + 4a3, a+ 4a2 + 5a3
 
and s(x, f) = a
2(1+a)
1+4a+7a2+6a3 · 
a2 + a3, a3, a3, a2(1 + a), a(1 + a)2, (1 + a)3
 
. Suppose firm 3 locates an arbitrary small ✏ > 0 to
the right. This deviation is always profitable.
(9) Suppose x1 < x2 < x3 < x4 < x5 < x6. By Kohlberg (1983), there is no SPE.
Example. Let a = 30. By Theorem 3.3, Figure 3 is the outcome of the SPE.
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0 x1 =
961
5582 x2 =
1891
5582 x3 = x4 =
1
2 x5 =
3691
5582 x6 =
4621
5582 1
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
Figure 3: SPE with six symmetric firms
3.2 Odd number of firms
3.2.1 Three firms
Assume N = {1, 2, 3}.
Proposition 3.4. For all a   0, there exists no SPE.
Proof. By Lemma 2.5 and symmetry, we distinguish two cases.
(1) Suppose x1 = x2 < x3. Since a1 = a2 = a, we have s1(x, f) = s2(x, f). See figure below.
0 x1 = x2 x3 1
s1 s2 s3
Solving the equalities yields s(x, f) =
⇣
a
1+3a ,
a
1+3a ,
1+a
1+3a
⌘
. Note that a > 0, since otherwise
s1(x, f) = s2(x, f) = 0 and then both firms could improve by locating at 1. Suppose firm 2 locates
at x02 = x3. Then
s2
 
(x 2, x02), f
 
=
2 + 4a+ 3a2
(1 + 3a)(4 + 3a)
.
Since s2 ((x 2, x02), f) > s2(x, f), firm 2 has an incentive to deviate.
(2) Suppose x1 < x2 < x3. By Kohlberg (1983), there is no SPE.
Remark. Contrary to the case of two firms, there is no SPE when firms are assumed to be
symmetric. This is in line with the observation that Hotelling’s model with three firms has no
equilibrium.
3.2.2 Five firms
Assume N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
Proposition 3.5. For all a > 0, there exists no SPE.
Proof. Assume a > 0. By Lemma 2.5 and symmetry, we distinguish the following five cases.
(1) Suppose x1 = x2 < x3 < x4 = x5. By Lemma 2.3 and Lemma 2.5, we obtain the figure
below.
0 x1 = x2 x3 x4 = x5 1
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
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We consider two subcases.
If z2(x, f) = x3, then solving the equalities yields x =
⇣
a
3+5a ,
a
3+5a ,
2a
3+5a ,
2+4a
3+5a ,
2+4a
3+5a
⌘
and
s(x, f) =
⇣
a
3+5a ,
a
3+5a ,
1+a
3+5a ,
1+a
3+5a ,
1+a
3+5a
⌘
. Suppose firm 2 locates at x02 = x3. Then
s2
 
(x 2, x02), f
 
=
a(4 + 5a)(4 + 6a+ a2)
(3 + 5a)(16 + 44a+ 32a2 + 5a3)
.
For this deviation to be unprofitable, we must have a = 0. This contradicts the assumption that
a > 0.
If z2(x, f) < x3 < z3(x, f), then solving the equalities yields x =⇣
(3+5a)x3+a+a2
9+18a+5a2 ,
(3+5a)x3+a+a2
9+18a+5a2 , x3,
(3+5a)x3+6+12a+4a2
9+18a+5a2 ,
(3+5a)x3+6+12a+4a2
9+18a+5a2
⌘
and s(x, f) =⇣
(3+5a)x3+a+a2
9+18a+5a2 ,
(3+5a)x3+a+a2
9+18a+5a2 ,
1+a
3+5a ,
 (3+5a)x3+3+6a+a2
9+18a+5a2 ,
 (3+5a)x3+3+6a+a2
9+18a+5a2
⌘
. Suppose firm 2 locates
at x02 = x2 + ✏, where ✏ > 0 but arbitrary small. For this deviation to be unprofitable, we must
have a = 0. This contradicts the assumption that a > 0.
(2) Suppose x1 = x2 < x3 = x4 < x5. By Lemma 2.3 and Lemma 2.5, we obtain the figure
below.
0 x1 = x2 x3 = x4 x5 1
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
Solving the equalities yields x =
⇣
a
1+5a ,
a
1+5a ,
3a
1+5a ,
3a
1+5a ,
4a
1+5a
⌘
and s(x, f) =⇣
a
1+5a ,
a
1+5a ,
a
1+5a ,
a
1+5a ,
1+a
1+5a
⌘
. Suppose firm 2 locates at x02 = s1 ((x 2, x02), f) + s2 ((x 2, x02), f).
Then
s2
 
(x 2, x02), f
 
=
a(2 + a)(3 + 5a)
(1 + a)(1 + 5a)(6 + 5a)
.
For this deviation to be unprofitable, we must have a = 0. This contradicts the assumption that
a > 0.
(3) Suppose x1 < x2 = x3 < x4 < x5. By Lemma 2.3 and Lemma 2.5, we obtain the figure
below.
0 x1 x2 = x3 x4 x5 1
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
Solving the equalities yields x =
⇣
a+a2
1+4a+5a2 ,
a+2a2
1+4a+5a2 ,
a+2a2
1+4a+5a2 ,
a+3a2
1+4a+5a2 ,
2a+4a2
1+4a+5a2
⌘
and s(x, f) =⇣
a+a2
1+4a+5a2 ,
a2
1+4a+5a2 ,
a2
1+4a+5a2 ,
a+a2
1+4a+5a2 ,
1+2a+a2
1+4a+5a2
⌘
. Suppose firm 3 locates at x03 = x4. Then
s3
 
(x 3, x03), f
 
=
a(8 + 22a+ 20a2 + 5a3)
(1 + 4a+ 5a2)(12 + 20a+ 5a2)
.
For this deviation to be unprofitable, we must have a = 0. This contradicts the assumption that
a > 0.
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(4) Suppose x1 = x2 < x3 < x4 < x5. By Lemma 2.3 and Lemma 2.5, we obtain the figure
below.
0 x1 = x2 x3 x4 x5 1
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
Solving the equalities yields x =
⇣
a3
1+4a+6a2+5a3 ,
a3
1+4a+6a2+5a3 ,
2a3
1+4a+6a2+5a3 ,
a2+3a3
1+4a+6a2+5a3 ,
a+3a2+4a3
1+4a+6a2+5a3
⌘
and s(x, f) =
⇣
a3
1+4a+6a2+5a3 ,
a3
1+4a+6a2+5a3
a2+a3
1+4a+6a2+5a3 ,
a+2a2+a3
1+4a+6a2+5a3 ,
1+3a+3a2+a3
1+4a+6a2+5a3
⌘
. Suppose firm
2 locates at x02 = x3. Then
s2
 
(x 2, x02), f
 
=
a2(6 + 10a+ 5a2)
(8 + 5a)(1 + 4a+ 6a2 + 5a3)
.
For this deviation to be unprofitable, we must have a = 0. This contradicts the assumption that
a > 0.
(5) Suppose x1 < x2 < x3 < x4 < x5. By Kohlberg (1983), there is no SPE.5
3.3 Discussion
The above results can be summarized as follows. The results of Hotelling’s model are robust for at
most three firms, but not for more than three firms. We have seen that there is a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium for two firms, independent of the value of a, and that there is no subgame
perfect equilibrium for three firms, also independent of the value of a. However, for more than
three firms, we have either discovered new equilibrium locations (for four and six firms) or no
equilibria at all (for five firms). This is in contrast to the original results. Unfortunately, there is
no general proof for the existence of subgame perfect equilibria that include waiting costs for more
than six firms. The conjecture is that existence is guaranteed if the number of firms is even and a
su ciently high, whereas there are no equilibria for an odd number of firms.
4 General latencies
In this section, we relax the assumption that all firms are symmetric.
4.1 Two firms
Assume N = {1, 2}.
Theorem 4.1. An SPE exists if and only if a1 = a2.
Proof. Assume an SPE exists. Let (x, f) be an SPE. Then by Lemma 2.4, x1 = s1(x, f) and
x2 = 1  s2(x, f). Since s1(x, f) + s2(x, f) = 1, we have x1 = x2 and thus by Lemma 2.5, a1 = a2.
Assume a1 = a2. By Theorem 3.1, x =
 
1
2 ,
1
2
 
and s(x, f) =
 
1
2 ,
1
2
 
forms an SPE.
Remark. There is no SPE if firms are asymmetric.
5A proof similar to the previous cases can be used to show the result.
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4.1.1 Three firms
Assume N = {1, 2, 3}. The first lemma shows that in an SPE it is impossible for all three firms to
choose a di↵erent location. This is in line with Kohlberg’s result.
Lemma 4.2. Let (x, f) be an SPE. Then x1 = x2 or x2 = x3.
Proof. Assume x1 < x2 < x3. By Lemma 2.4, we have x1 = s1(x, f) and x3 = 1   s3(x, f). See
figure below.
0 x1 x2 x3 1
s1 s2 s3
Solving the equalities yields
s1(x, f) =
(1 + 2a2 + a3)x2 + a2a3
1 + a1 + 2a2 + a3 + a1a2 + a1a3 + a2a3
,
s2(x, f) =
(a1   a3)x2 + a1a3 + a3
1 + a1 + 2a2 + a3 + a1a2 + a1a3 + a2a3
,
s3(x, f) =
(1 + a1 + 2a2)x2 + a1a3 + a2a3 + a3
1 + a1 + 2a2 + a3 + a1a2 + a1a3 + a2a3
.
Suppose firm 2 locates at x02 = x1. Then
s2
 
(x 2, x02), f
 
=
a1((2 + a1 + 4a2 + a3)x2 + a3(2 + 2a1 + 4a2 + a3 + a1a2 + a1a3 + a2a3))
(1 + a1 + 2a2 + a3 + a1a2 + a1a3 + a2a3)(2a1 + 2a2 + a1a2 + a1a3 + a2a3)
.
Under the assumption that x1 < x2 < x3,
s2(x, f)   s2
 
(x 2, x02, f
 
)) a3  a1   2.
Suppose firm 2 locates at x002 = x3. Then
s2
 
(x 2, x002, f
 
) =
a3( (2 + a1 + 4a2 + a3)x2 + 2 + 3a1 + 4a2 + a3 + a21 + 4a1a2 + 2a1a3 + a21a2 + a21a3 + a1a2a3)
(1 + a1 + 2a2 + a3 + a1a2 + a1a3 + a2a3)(2a2 + 2a3 + a1a2 + a1a3 + a2a3)
.
Under the assumption that x1 < x2 < x3,
s2(x, f)   s2
 
(x 2, x002), f
 ) a3   a1 + 2.
Since a3  a1   2 and a3   a1 + 2 are incompatible, firm 2 always has a profitable deviation.
Now we can state the main result of this subsection.
Theorem 4.3. An SPE exists if and only if (a) a1 = a2 and a3   a2 + 2, or (b) a2 = a3 and
a1   a2 + 2. In case an SPE exists, it is unique.
For (a), the SPE (x, f) is given by x =
⇣
a3
1+a2+2a3
, a31+a2+2a3 ,
2a3
1+a2+2a3
⌘
and
s(x, f) =
⇣
a3
1+a2+2a3
, a31+a2+2a3 ,
1+a2
1+a2+2a3
⌘
.
For (b), the SPE (x, f) is given by x =
⇣
1+a2
1+2a1+a2
, 1+a1+a21+2a1+a2 ,
1+a1+a2
1+2a1+a2
⌘
and
s(x, f) =
⇣
1+a2
1+2a1+a2
, a11+2a1+a2 ,
a1
1+2a1+a2
⌘
.
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Proof. Let (x, f) be an SPE. By Lemma 2.4, we have x1 = s1(x, f) and x3 = 1  s3(x, f). Lemma
4.2 implies x1 = x2 or x2 = x3. We show the analysis for x1 = x2. A symmetric argument can be
completed for x2 = x3.
Let x1 = x2. By Lemma 2.5, we have a1 = a2 and thus s1(x, f) = s2(x, f). See figure below.
0 x1 = x2 x3 1
s1 s2 s3
Solving the equalities yields
s1(x, f) = s2(x, f) =
a3
1 + a2 + 2a3
,
s3(x, f) =
1 + a2
1 + a2 + 2a3
.
Note that a3 > 0, since otherwise s1(x, f) = s2(x, f) = 0 and then both firms could improve by
locating at 1.
Suppose firm 2 locates at x02 = x3. Then
s2
 
(x 2, x02), f
 
=
a3(2 + 3a2 + a3 + a22 + 2a2a3)
(1 + a2 + 2a3)(2a2 + 2a3 + a22 + 2a2a3)
.
So
s2(x, f)   s2
 
(x 2, x02), f
 ) a3   a2 + 2.
To prove that the strategy profile is an SPE, it is su cient to check that firm 2 does not want
to deviate to the right, and firm 3 does not want to deviate to the left.
For firm 2. Since market shares are piecewise linear in the location of firm 2, firm 2 has no
incentive to locate at x02, with x2 < x02  x3. Since 1   s2 ((x 2, x02), f) < x3 if x02 = x3, there is
also no incentive for firm 2 to locate as the rightmost firm.
For firm 3. Observe that firm 3 could only improve by being the leftmost firm. Suppose firm 3
locates as leftmost firm at x03 = s3 ((x 3, x03), f). Then
s3
 
(x 3, x03), f
 
=
(1 + a2)(a2 + 2a3)
(1 + a2 + 2a3)(2 + a2 + 2a3)
.
Since s3 ((x 3, x03), f) < s3(x, f) if a3   a2 + 2, firm 3 has no incentive to deviate.
Hence the strategy profile is an SPE.
Remark. (1) Contrary to the case of two firms, there is an SPE if firms are asymmetric. (2) If all
latencies are su ciently small, then there exists no SPE (since either a1   a2 + 2 or a3   a2 + 2).
Example. Let a1 = a2 = 0 and a3 = 2. By Theorem 4.3, Figure 4 is the outcome of the SPE.
0 x1 = x2 =
2
5 x3 =
4
5 1
s1 s2 s3
Figure 4: SPE with three firms.
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4.2 Four firms
Assume N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. The following example displays an equilibrium in which there is a firm
that is less e cient than another firm, while obtaining a larger market share. The example also
shows that there exist di↵erent subgame perfect equilibria if we allow firms to be asymmetric.
Example. Let a1 = a2 = 0, a3 = 3
2
3 and a4 = 4
2
5 . Figure 5 is the outcome of the strategy profile
(x, f). Notice that s3(x, f) =
33
310 <
7
62 = s4(x, f).
0 x1 = x2 =
121
310 x3 =
121
155 x4 =
55
62 1
s1 s2 s3 s4
Figure 5: SPE with four asymmetric firms.
Solving the equalities yields x =
 
121
310 ,
121
310 ,
121
155 ,
55
62
 
and s(x, f) =
 
121
310 ,
121
310 ,
33
310 ,
7
62
 
. To prove
that the strategy profile is an SPE, it is su cient to check that firm 2 does not want to deviate to
the right, firm 3 does not want to deviate to the left nor to the right, and firm 4 does not want to
deviate to the left.
For firm 2. Since market shares are piecewise linear in the location of firm 2, we show that firm
2 has no incentive to locate at x02 = x3: s2((x 2, x02), f) =
121
310 . Then we show that firm 2 has no
incentive to locate at x002 = x4: s2((x 2, x002), f) =
103
310 . Since 1  103310 < 5562 , there is also no incentive
to locate as rightmost firm.
For firm 3. Observe that firm 3 could only improve by being the leftmost or rightmost firm.
Suppose firm 3 locates as leftmost firm at x03 = s3 ((x 3, x03), f). Then s3 ((x 3, x03), f) =
363
4340 .
Suppose firm 3 locates as rightmost firm at x003 = 1 s3 ((x 3, x003), f). Then s3 ((x 3, x03), f) = 226822475 .
Since s3 ((x 3, x03), f) < s3(x, f) and s3 ((x 3, x003), f) < s3(x, f), firm 3 has no incentive to deviate.
For firm 3. Observe that firm 4 could only improve by being the leftmost firm. Suppose
firm 4 locates as leftmost firm at x04 = s4 ((x 4, x04), f). Then s4 ((x 4, x04), f) =
121
1674 . Since
s4 ((x 4, x04), f) < s4(x, f), firm 4 has no incentive to deviate.
4.3 Discussion
The last two examples show that the set of equilibria increases if we allow firms the be su ciently
asymmetric. So instead of asking the question whether equilibria exist, it seems more appropriate
to ask how they look like. From our results it is clear that a variety of (interesting) equilibria exist
in the model with linear latencies. However, a full characterization remains an open question.
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